Abstract-Several access control policy languages have been proposed for specifying access control policies for pushbased XML access control systems. This paper investigates the scalability of the current XML-based policy languages. It starts by introducing the well-known general access control models with more focus on their scalability. Then, the XMLbased policy languages are presented followed by evaluating their management and system scalability. This paper founds that there is a need for using decentralized trusted management concept for addressing the scalability issue in XML access control. Also, using IBE will help in providing several access control features as temporal and delegable access.
I. INTRODUCTION Extensible Markup Language (XML) is defined by
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and has become a standard for data representation and transmission on the Web. XML documents disseminated on the Web may contain a secret data that must be protected from unauthorized users, so the XML access control is an important topic in Web information security [1] .
An access control system provides a security policy in which only authorized users can access specific objects or resources. It has two main parts which are policy specification and policy enforcement [1, 2] . The former part is a language used for defining access policies by the system management (administrator/s). The policy enforcement is used to enforce the defined policies during the delivering of the object(s) to users.
Based on the policy enforcement, existing XML access control systems are classified into two categories or types, which are [1]:
1. Pull-based systems: A server receives a request from a client and responds with an appropriate view (document portion). Since the view is sent to only one user so it can be protected using the existing network security techniques such as IP security (IPsec) or secure socket layer (SSL) protocols.
2. Push-based systems: Periodically, the server publishes or broadcasts the whole document to all users. The document cannot be completely protected using IPSec or SSL protocols as the document nodes have different access by different users. As a solution, the nodes are encrypted with different secret (symmetric) keys. The secret keys are distributed to users in a way that each user receives only the secret keys of the nodes that he is authorized to access.
However, applying the early access control methods, which are developed for the traditional databases, directly to XML documents causes new challenges that must be addressed by any XML access control. These challenges are [3, 4, 5, 6] : i) supporting fine-grained access control, means supporting access to granularity nodes (here object is called node as an element and its sub-elements), this means that the nodes can be elements/attributes allocated at any level in the document structure; and ii) supporting XML documents as well as XML schema (DTD or XML Schema).
Several XML-based policy languages (X-Sec, Policy Query Language, XACML and trust-based XML policy Language) have been proposed in the literature. These languages mostly specify access policies in XML-based documents. The most, if not all, of existing XML-based policy languages specifies their access control policies based on the DAC or RBAC models, since the MAC model cannot be used for providing fine-grained access control systems.
The contribution of this paper is to investigate the scalability of the XML-based policy languages. It starts by introducing the access control models (DAC, MAC, and RBAC) while discussing their scalability. Then, the popular XML-based policy languages are presented followed by evaluating their scalability. Also, several open issues and research gaps are presented.
The rest of this paper starts with introducing the access control models in Section II followed by presenting the XML-based policy languages in Section III. The evaluation criteria are presented in Section IV. Finally, the discussion and conclusion are presented in Section V and section VI, respectively.
II. ACCESS CONTROL MODELS
Policy languages use access control model as a basis for specifying the access control policies. Then, the specified access policies are enforced by the policy enforcement during the delivering of the accessed objects to users. In 978-1-4799-6444-4/14/$31.00 ©2014 IEEE fact, there are three well-known general access control models, which are:
• Discretionary Access Control (DAC).
• Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
• Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
The following subsections discuss the above three models in detail.
A. Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
This model is defined by a Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria in 1985. A two dimensional matrix is used for specifying the policies in such a way that each row is used for defining a user and a each column is used for defining an object. A cell ) , ( j i in the matrix specifies the operations that the user i can do on the object j Implementing the access control matrix as a two dimensional array wastes the system memory, as the array size will be large as most of the cells in the array are expected to be empty [7] . Therefore, the access control matrix is implemented using three approaches which are authorization table, access control list, and capabilities list [7, 8] .
DAC model offers several advantages such as flexibility, simplicity and easy implementation. These advantages make DAC a possible model to many application environments [9, 10] . However, the DAC model cannot be used for providing a scalable access control system and management since using the access control matrix requires specifying and handling a large number of access control policies [10] .
B. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
MAC model is designed based on the Bell and LaPadula model [11] and it was firstly designed for the operating systems [10] . Unlike the DAC model in which the access policies are specified by its data owner, in MAC the policies are defined by a central authority. In addition, a sensitivity level is assigned to both users and objects where increasing the level increases the sensitivity. The user cannot access any object if his sensitivity level is less than the sensitivity level of the object [10] .
MAC model was widely used in a military area since it is more secure than the DAC model. But, MAC model has some weaknesses such as it cannot provide a fine-grained access, it is a difficult model and it has expensive implementations.
C. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
RBAC model is proposed by Ferraiolo and Kuhn [12] as an alternative model to the DAC and MAC models [13] . Unlike the DAC model, RBAC model uses the role concept which groups the users as well as permissions. As a result, it provides a more scalable solution. The RBAC model assigns the permissions to roles and then the users to roles. Using the role concept, the RBAC model provides a scalable access control system and management by reducing the number of the required access control policies.
Until now, several RBAC models have been proposed. The standard RBAC model, which is called NIST RBAC, is proposed by Ferraiolo et al., [13] . Fig 1 shows the standard RBAC model which has four main elements and four main relation-sets. The four main elements of the standard RBAC are Users, Roles, Permissions, and Sessions. The Permissions element has two sub-elements namely Objects and Operations sub-elements. These sub-elements are connected to each other with a many-to-many relation-set. The Sessions element is used for initializing one and only once access session for each connected user. The user access session can be assigned to more than one role. The role can be assigned to several access sessions to be accessed by different users. The four main relation-sets are User-session, User-assignment, Permission-assignment, and Session-roles.
The RBAC model offers several advantages, which all can be used for coming out with a scalable access control system and management. These advantages are [8, 10, 14] : First, reducing the required number of policies and, as a result, reducing the system and management workload; and second, improving the scalability by distributing the workloads of specifying and handling the access control policies.
III. XML-BASED ACCESS CONTROL POLICY LANGUAGES
In this Section, the four well-known XML-based policy languages (X-Sec, Policy Query Language, XACML and trust-based XML policy language) for push-based XML access control are discussed.
A. X-Sec
X-Sec [15] uses the DAC model as a basis for specifying the policies. A fine-grained access is supported by specifying the nodes (objects) using their XPath expressions. XML schema is also supported using the DTD schema.
The access control policies are specified in two XMLbased files called Users_credentials and Policy-base. The former file is used for specifying the credentials of users while the later file is used for specifying the permission statements. The users are grouped into credentials which are then assigned to the permissions, instead of assigning the users directly to their permissions. . Then, the permission is assigned to one or more credential which is here the Student credential. The content-based access is supported by adding an access condition (e.g., Level="First"). The read operation is only used in this example but XSec supports other operations, which are, view, navigate, browse all, delete, insert, and update. 
B. XML Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
Now, XACML is now called OASIS XACML [16] because it was adopted in February 2003 as a standard by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). In OASIS XACML, the policies are specified based on the RBAC model. The users are optionally grouped to credentials. The fine-grained access control is supported by specifying the objects using their XPath expressions. Access control to the XML schema is provided using XML Schema. The content-based access control can be optionally supported by the developed implementation. OASIS XACML supports four operations, which are, read, write, create, and delete.
In fact, XACML is a general policy language and it is widely used now in a large scale and distributed access control systems. Discussing this language in details is impossible here due to the limited space.
C. Policy Query Language
The policy query language is proposed in [17] . Based on the DAC model, this policy language specifies policies as queries using the XQuery language [18] which is used for querying data from XML documents. Fig 4 illustrates an example of access control policy specified using this language. The nodes are specified in TARGET clause using XPath expressions so they can be granularity nodes. The subject (which is a set of nodes) is specified in FOR clause. The keys, which are used for encrypting/decrypting the nodes, are specified in KEYS clause. In the WHERE clause, a condition(s) is specified for supporting the content-based access control.
Unlike the previous XML policy languages, this language is proposed to be only used with a push-based XML access control system. As shown in Fig 4, the specified nodes are not attached with any access operation (such as read, or write) since decryption ability is only considered with all nodes. However, this language is the first push-based XML access control policy language. 
D. Trust-based XML Policy Language
In [19, 20] , a push-based XML access control policy language is proposed based on RBAC and decentralized trust management (DTM) concepts. This language is proposed for large scale push-based XML access control systems and it has been extended for cloud computing in [21] . The access control policies are specified in three XML-based documents namely user access certificate, permission certificate and role certificate. Also, these certificates are defined using XML schema.
Each certificate specifies only a single entity (user, role or permission) and signed with administrator's private key. As a result, this language can be used for large scale systems as it simplifies and secures the policies distribution. The users are grouped using the role concept. Each user is provided with his own access certificate which includes the user ID, access right (roles), public key and so on. Objects are specified inside the permissions certificates using XPath expressions.
Finally, the user as well as administrator public/private keys are generated using identity-based encryption (IBE). This helps in providing a temporal and delegable access without using a temporal access control policies as used in X-Sec and, as a result, improving the system scalability. In addition, in IBE the public key is the user identity (e.g., name or email and so on) so it is easy to have a temporal key (such as sam@yahoo.com+2011) and delegable key (such as sam@yahoo.com+2011+May), here the delegable key is also a temporal key but it is used by a third party [22] .
IV. EVALUATION CRITERIA
Developing a scalable access control system and management needs a policy language that is able to specify the policies in a distributed manner. This is because that any scalable access control system need to distribute the system and management workloads into different machines and several administrators, respectively [23] .
Here, criteria for evaluating the presented XML-based policy languages (in Section III) are presented. The evaluation criteria used are selected according to several requirements that must be addressed in two related issues, which are access control basic and scalability requirements.
The access control basic requirements are evaluated using the following criteria [1, 10, 23 , and 24]:
1. Users grouping: Grouping the users helps on improving the system and management scalability by reducing the number of the required policies.
2. Fine-grained: Measures if the policy language supports granularity objects.
3. XML schema: Measures the ability of specifying policies files based on a predefined XML schema such as DTA and XML Schema.
4. Content-based (conditional) access: If the objects can be accessed based on their content; this means the user has to know some of the object content.
5. Temporal access: Ability of specifying temporal access, in which the user has a temporal access based on his subscription period.
6. Delegable access: Ability of user to temporally delegate his access right to another user.
Operations: Measures if the available operations
(read, write, etc.) are suitable and enough. For pushbased access control, only a read operation is required.
The ability of the related XML-based policy languages to provide a scalable access control system and management is measured using several features, which are [23 and 24]:
1. Decentralized management: The ability of distributing the workload of specifying the policies into several administrators.
2. Extensibility: Measures the ability of the policy language to be used for specifying the access control policies by different remote applications.
3. User certificate: If the user is provided with a certificate.
V. DISCUSSION
The scalability of the reviewed XML policy language is evaluated here using the evaluation criteria discussed in the previous Section. Table 1 summaries the evaluation results and it is clear that these policy languages still have several basic and/or scalability unaddressed issues as discussed below.
A. Basic Requirements
Here and due to the limited space provided, only important criteria, temporal and delegable basis requirements, are discussed. The other basic requirements are clearly presented in Table 1 .
The provided temporal access in X-Sec requires giving the users temporal decryption keys and also specifying temporal policies in such a way that a policy is re-specified several times with different access periods if it is assigned to different users with different access periods. This weakness increases the number of the specified policies and, as a result, affects the access control management and system scalability [10] . The temporal access is supported by the trust-based XML policy language using only temporal decryption keys and based on the identity based encryption (IBE).
The delegable access is supported in XACML during the system implementation and supporting the delegable access from the early stage (e.g., policy specification) will provide a more flexible solution. In the trust-based XML policy language, the delegable access is supported from earlier stage and using the IBE.
However, several issues still require more research work. For example, extending the trust-based XML policy language to support authorities' delegation from one administrator to another and from one level to a lower level. Also, applying an approach for generating the IBE-based public/private keys without requiring a trust party. This is because in trust-based XML policy language the public/private keys are generated using the subscription engine and the administrator in this engine must be trusted. Finally, applying a hierarchical IBE schema for reducing the computation overhead of subscription engine by enabling the users to generate the delegated keys when they delegate their access to other users, instead of generating the delegated keys by the subscription engine.
B. Scalability Requirements
The scalability is evaluated using three criteria. These criteria are decentralized management, extensibility and user certificate [23] . In fact, these three criteria are similar to the features of decentralized trust management concept [25, 26] . The decentralized management and extensibility are essential for providing a scalable access control management while the user certificate is also essential and used for evaluating the system scalability.
Based on the comparison result presented in Table 1 , it is observed that XACML and trust-based XML policy language seem to be the best XML policy languages for having a scalable XML access control system and management.
In XACML, the decentralized management is possible during the system implementation. The extensibility feature is not provided in all three policy languages. In the trustbased XML policy language, both features are supported. This feature requires enabling the administrator to specify access control policies remotely, signing them with his private key and then whenever required extending the specified policies to the main or central policy repository.
The user credential is very important for providing a scalable access control system. In this case, each user has his own user credential, specified as a separated file, and signed with the administrator or issuer private key. So, the system needs only the user certificate for evaluating the user request. This manner provides a good scalability advantage which is that the policy enforcement load can be distributed into several servers since each server doesn't need more than the user certificate during making the access decision. This feature is supported by the XACML as well as trustbased XML policy language. VI. CONCLUSION This paper reviews the existing XML-based policy languages while evaluating their scalability. It also introduces the existing access control models along with their use in XML access control. This paper founds that there is several basic and scalability requirements that have not been addressed in the current XML-based policy languages. In term of the basic requirements, some points have been suggested for future development such as supporting authorities delegation (from one administrator to another or from one administrative level to a lower level), generating IBE public/private keys without requiring a trusted third party, and using a hierarchical IBE scheme for enabling the user to generate a delegable key, instead of generating it by the system and to reduce the system overhead. Also, while these policy languages allow us to know who can access which object and using which access operation? But, there is a need to consider the security of the whole access control environments and platforms. So, integrating access control polices with a tamper proof security devices, such as Trusted Platform Module (TPM), can lead to more trusted and secure polices.
Our ongoing work is extending this research paper by covering all aspects of push-based XML access control systems through reviewing and evaluating their policy enforcements and key managements.
